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Abstract
Economic infrastructure hubs, such as ports, are crucial sites for exploring new political
geographies. In such environments, mobilities are enabled and rigidly channelled premised on
the stasis of the port-as-checkpoint. Such nodes are part of an ever-growing political geography of
zones that requires more attention. This article proposes a ‘topolographical’ approach – a
combined heuristic drawing from political topography and topology – to comprehend more
fully the transformations in the political geographies of large-scale infrastructures. The cardinal
nature of the port of Dar es Salaam makes it a crucial site through which to illustrate the purchase
of this framework. The topographical analysis puts forward the port of Dar as archipelago of
global territories, within which heterogeneous actors claim graduated authority. Drawing on
topology, the article shows what is folded into the port, constantly shaping not only who
governs but, more importantly, how power and authority are exercised. It will be shown how
imaginaries of the port – as gateway, seamless space, and modernity ‘from scratch’ – as much as
new technological devices work to produce historically and geographically distinct political
geographies, and indeed bring new ones into being.
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Introduction
In February 2013, the President of Tanzania Jakaya Kikwete unveiled the Big Results Now
(BRN) initiative. In addition to articulating a vision of Tanzania in 2025 professedly
chiselled according to the ‘Malaysian Model of Development’,1 BRN deﬁned transport as
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one of six key result areas. A roadmap for the transport sector followed, which largely
reproduced the now dominant parlance amidst the Dar es Salaam port community and
international donors. The roadmap considered eﬃciency and redrawing traﬃc ﬂows as
almost exact synonyms. Superposed to maps of the existing layout, red and orange-
coloured arrows and lines heralded a new ‘single-ﬂow system’ purportedly capable of
reducing truck turnaround time from six to two hours, and shattering current barriers to
freight ﬂows (GoT, 2013). In line with the World Bank funded ‘Maritime Gateway’ project
for Dar es Salaam,2 these visions also aspire to overturn how security checks and
weighbridge procedures were performed across far-reaching development corridors, thus
making the presence of the port immediately ‘felt’ in operations carried out in distant
places. Fresh topological imaginaries were thus projected into public discussion, which
aspired to reformulate the purview of port operations. Embedded in the maps, also
travelled topographical claims to spatial authority broadcast by the port bureaucracy.
Such large-scale plans for infrastructure projects have proliferated in Africa and elsewhere
in recent years. A massive ‘respacing’ (Engel and Nugent, 2010) is under way that however
remains little understood. In order to address this, the article examines the port of Dar es
Salaam, following Chalﬁn’s lead in the need to conduct research ‘wherever power in late-
modernity is concentrated and renewed yet works to hide itself’ (2010a: 4; Ferguson, 1990;
Mitchell, 2002). The article interrogates the port as space that dispersed networks of
production and consumption bring into being. Such nodes of infrastructure serve as
pertinent empirical sites through which to learn more about new political geographies: as
argued by Easterling (2014: 15), in the contemporary world, ‘some of the most radical
changes to the globalizing world are being written, not in the language of law and
diplomacy, but rather in the spatial formation of infrastructure’. These become
particularly visible, and visible in new ways, in ex-centric sites in Africa, in which the
Western narrative of modernity is but one amongst others informing people’s ways of
imagining and constructing the world (Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ, 2012).
This article suggests a combined methodology that draws from political topography and
political topology to comprehend the transformation of political geographies of
infrastructure hubs. To reinvigorate how we think about space, it has been disassociated
from ideas of stasis and boundedness, and come to be understood as ﬂuid, embracing
relationality, heterogeneity and change (Massey, 2005: 13). Yet while spatialities are
‘stories so far’ (2005: 9), venturing to the other extreme – in Massey’s words an
‘extravaganza of non-Euclidian, black-holey [..] previously topologically improbable
evocations’ (2005: 13) – must be avoided. A productive approach, we suggest, is
somewhere in between.
The article illustrates the purchase of a combined, topolographical methodology with
regard to the political geography of the port of Dar es Salaam. Our topographical
analysis puts forward the port as archipelago of global territories within which
heterogeneous actors claim authority. Drawing on topology, the article shows what is
folded into the port and shapes who governs, but also how power and authority are
exercised, and from where, and the ways in which this has been made possible.
Imaginaries – of the port as gateways and seamless space, and of modernity ‘from
scratch’ – as much as new technological devices – international standards and electronic
devices – work to produce historically and geographically distinct political geographies, and
indeed bring new ones into being.
To substantiate this argument, the article draws on the ﬁndings from interviews and
participant observation with a variety of port stakeholders involved in clearing and
transporting cargo from and to the port of Dar es Salaam, including the port authority.
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In addition, it builds upon a review of the narratives and claims to authority reﬂected in
policy papers and expert reports produced by the port authority and international donors
over the past ﬁve years until 2016, which are complemented with sources from Tanzanian
newspapers. Fieldwork was carried out in the spring of 2015.
The article ﬁrst analyses existing literature on infrastructure investment and political
spatiality, and then develops a heuristic lens drawing from both political topography and
topology. The third section introduces the port of Dar, and the fourth one demonstrates the
archipelago-like territoriality of the port and hybrid topography of regulation. The ﬁfth
section unfolds a topological analysis of Dar port that features three elements:
Imaginaries of gateways, new technical devices, and Dubai-style modernity ‘from scratch’.
The conclusion summarizes the argument and enumerates the beneﬁts implied in drawing
from political topography and topology to study the political spatialities of large-scale
economic infrastructures.
New political geographies and nodes of infrastructure
Transcontinental mobilities are premised on the stasis of ports. Growing mobility, such as
the explosion of container shipping from the 1960s, depends on similarly growing ‘multiple
ﬁxities or moorings often on a substantial physical scale that enable the ﬂuidities of liquid
modernity’ (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 210). As much as capital is not footless, but builds on
oﬃces, national aﬃliations, oﬀ-shore zones and ports, territoriality is not vanishing but
remains crucial for enabling globality for some, while foreclosing others (Elden, 2005;
Jessop et al., 2008). Recent literature on enclaves and zones also indicates the continuing
importance of political topography. It provides powerful tools for mapping processes of re-
territorialization, such as with oﬀshore ﬁnancial centres, technological zones of extraction
and other ‘global territories’ (Opitz and Tellmann, 2012) such as ports. Some of these nodes
have received attention within political geography and international relations (IR) for how
they are linked to broader political projects (Barry, 2013; Ho¨nke, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2007).
With regard to ports, Chalﬁn posits that ‘[i]n Africa, as elsewhere, ports are a telling
indicator of the tenor of political power and the contests and shifting fortunes among
ruling groups’ (2010b: 573). At times, large-scale infrastructure projects reify and reinforce
state authority but supply chain security also decouples state borders from traditional state
territory. Among others, such bordering operates through the creation of exceptional zones
or ‘secure areas’ in which domestic laws and rights are mediated or suspended (Cowen, 2014:
81). Ports exemplify such zones and are thus crucial sites for exploring multifaceted
transformations of power and authority.
The challenge in analysing such zones is the proclivity to reproduce the idea that they are
territories closed oﬀ from the local environment; an idea that has been prominent in the
literature on enclaves (e.g. Ferguson, 2005). Oil and mining enclaves, according to this
narrative, were closed oﬀ from the local population through the practices of security
forces and ever more sophisticated security technology. However, even enclaves of
extraction are very much connected to the world around them. They host bubbles of
governance characterized by a proliferation of transnational standards, technologies and
professionals (Ho¨nke, 2013). Considerable work is indeed required to disembed them
from their surroundings, and make their entanglements invisible (Appel, 2012). At the
same time, enclaved spaces with graduated sovereignty (Ong, 2006) have become a typical
feature of postcolonial geographies. While narratives of political legitimation keep
referencing the idea of an all-encompassing state, ‘development’ is more and more enacted
in transnationally connected and diﬀerentially bounded zones (Sidaway, 2007). For ports,
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such a mixture of dis-embedding and connecting is evident. Thus an energetic and ﬂexible
approach to the political geography of economic infrastructure hubs is required.
A ‘topolographical’ methodology
With Massey (2005: 99–100), power-geometries are geometries of relations that include the
structuring of space through both ﬂows and enclosure, both being diﬀerentially empowering
and disempowering. Together, ﬂows and enclosures create proximity and distance; distances
that are not necessarily visible in terms of metrics but may be imagined, or felt. Two distinct
traditions have tended to focus on one or the other: political topography has tended to focus
on the production and maintenance of enclosure, while political topology has leaned
towards ﬂows and processes of becoming.3 Of course, enclosures are produced, and
territory is an eﬀect of networked socio-technical practices (Painter, 2010). Thus the two
traditions are not mutually exclusive and our point is not an ontological one about topology
and topography being distinct, or the latter a subtype of the former.4 Our point here is
methodological. We suggest that a fruitful way for empirically grasping the changing
political geometries (Massey) of infrastructure hubs is to draw together insights from both
traditions.
This is crucial to counter the tendency to salute diminished territorial powers and
expanding ﬂows as if they were paving the way for universal rights and mobility instead
of paying attention to forms of power and authority that operate through global
technologies and practices of logistics (Cowen 2014). Instead of celebrating fragility and
ever more opportunities for change as such, it is also important to capture the moorings on
which these very ﬂows rely. While infrastructures of logistics encapsulate the epitome of
contemporary ideas of mobility, we must detect topological and topographical technologies
of security and human labour exploitation from Dubai to Dar.
This section therefore reviews the respective methodological strengths of political
topography and topology, and retrieves a ‘topolographical’ heuristic drawing from
both. Ports make visible the reconﬁguration of surface space including processes
through which bounded space, and claims to authority over it, serve as political
technology (Painter, 2010; Sack, 1986). Political topography has a lot to oﬀer here as
it asks how power maps onto physical space, tracing the imprint of claims to authority in
physical space. A topological sensibility has shed light more on how relations of
proximity and distance, disconnected from measurable distance, shape infrastructure as
they are put into play politically.
In the past though, topography and topology have been pitted against one another (Paasi,
2011). Emboldened by the fact that territoriality has endured as a crucial governmental
technology, ‘topographists’ have defended the merit of long-held views concerning
authority over physical space (Mann, 1984; Peet, 2007). ‘Topologists’, in response, argued
that globalization is relentlessly re-conﬁguring power within and beyond territories and
metric distance (Allen, 2009, 2011; Jones and Jessop, 2010). Fixity versus mobility,
absolute versus relative space: the opposition of these pairs has overdrawn the supposed
binary between the two.
More recently, the dust from the controversy has begun to settle (Elden, 2011; Harvey,
2012; Prince, 2016). While drawing on a topological understanding of power, it remains
important not to move from a ‘territorial trap’ into a ‘non-territorial’ one (Jones, 2009; Opitz
and Tellmann, 2012: 264). Making things global by making them move through ports is
subject to territorial constraints as much as topological forces (Allen, 2009: 197–198). Nodes
of infrastructure are hence ‘site[s] of intersection between networked topologies and
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territorial legacies’ (Massey, 2005: 102) in which the distant and the proximate, the virtual
and the material, and ﬂow and ﬁxity are folded together.
It is therefore worthwhile to extract the tools that the literatures on political topography
and topology oﬀer to grasp these multiple spatialities. In work on political topography,
power usually has ‘location and extension [. . .] and supposes physical distances which
consist of measurable spans of the globe [. . .], and who [. . .] is capable of controlling such
distances’ (Allen, 2011: 284). With regards to location, political topography is interested in
the expression of power and authority in physical space and how a particular spatiality of
power, such as territory, is produced (Boone, 2003). Topographical maps place vegetation,
settlements, infrastructure in two-dimensional space, and provide the metric distance
between these elements. Political topographies, in turn, capture power relations as
projected over physical space.
Surveying authority over surface space, political topography has thus been concerned
with the study of the whereabouts of power, in and around singular sites and with its
extension and gradient across regions. Accordingly, work on political topography has
aspired to read relations of power, and shifts in these relations, from physical barriers,
buildings and legal, political and social practice in space (e.g. Sassen, 2006). It has also
expanded to ‘spatialise’ how and where power operates within states, including power
relationships between the centre and periphery, and their singular trajectories in response
to local factors (Boone, 2003; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Ho¨nke, 2010). Political
topographies also map networks and ﬂows; a topography of expert knowledge for
instance places research institutions and epistemic communities on a traditional, metric map.
Political topography has thus much to oﬀer for studying infrastructure hubs such as
ports. The tools we draw from it are, ﬁrst, to include the study of representations of
physical boundaries as viewed by planners and governors, and to trace claims to
authority over (parts of) the port. To trace such representations, the collection and
analysis of policy documents, maps and regulatory texts is required. This should be
complemented and contrasted with the tracing of objects, and analysis of symbols of
claims to authority placed in surface space, and an interpretation of everyday practices of
governing physical space.
Nevertheless, political topography has limitations that impoverish the study of spatialities
of power. Linked to an underlying idea of compartmentalized, territorial zones of authority,
political topographies have a tendency to focus on particular products of space making, and
the strategies of such ﬁxing (Jones, 2009). However, contemporary practices of security, for
instance, extend border management ‘outward into the ports of foreign states [. . .and]
inward along domestic transport networks’ (Cowen, 2014: 81). Furthermore, variation in
policy changes cannot be understood without the stretching and folding of near and far: of
what is made present and what is kept at a distance or excluded from debate (Prince, 2016).
This point is crucial for students of infrastructure space, as the contemporary folding and
stretching of state borders works in ways topography alone has diﬃculties in fully grasping.
Work on political topology stresses how relations make up and endlessly reconstitute
space. Importantly, political topology goes beyond ‘the metrics of size, distance and length’
(Allen, 2016: 8) and draws attention to who and which ideas extend inﬂuence, unrelated to
physical closeness. Indeed, who creates and shapes space is often independent from
proximity and distance in a Eucledian sense, as we will discuss below with regard to port
rankings and the powerful idea of the ‘Dubai model’ in Tanzanian port reforms. Such an
approach is also helpful for thinking space as made up of ‘intensive relationships which
create the distances between powerful and not so powerful actors’ (Allen, 2011: 284; also
Massey, 2005).
Ho¨nke and Cuesta-Fernandez 5
In this regard, it becomes crucial to trace processes of ‘presencing’ (Prince, 2016: 4), and
thus processes that construct proximity. Publics might for instance be mobilized in a way
that brings an issue and a locality close to people who are physically thousands of miles
away. Similarly, the possibilities for political action are constituted not only by those ‘in a
place’ but by discourses, technologies and other practices (of lean production, eﬃciency and
seamless space) circulating across boundaries. We advance a focus on two speciﬁc processes
in particular.
The ﬁrst concerns the imaginaries attached to, and generated by, nodes of infrastructure,
which render distant objects closer or farther. Infrastructures do not only perform technical
functions; they also generate visions and evoke desire (Larkin, 2013). There is a long
tradition of using large-scale infrastructures to represent state power to its citizens
(Chalﬁn, 2010b; Swyngedouw, 2007). As the anthropology of the state has shown, roads,
dams and massive buildings enact ‘the state’ (Larkin, 2013). The seductions of modern
futures that they encapsulate work powerfully when a slum dweller in Kinshasa, whose
home was brutally removed from the site for new buildings, states ‘Yes, we’ll be the
victims [. . .] but still it will be beautiful’ (De Boeck, 2011: 278). But powerful imaginaries
can of course work in diﬀerent ways. In fact, more and more political projects are advanced
today by invoking less state-focussed and rather ‘topological imaginations’ (Marres, 2012).
Such imaginations share commitments to ideas of ﬂows, virtual space and social networks
but often do not commit to openness and change inherent within many topological theories
of the social (Marres, 2012). In any case, appreciation may well be disconnected from
functionality. Debate surrounding the port of Dar es Salaam hints as to how
infrastructure comes to represent ‘the possibility of being modern, of having a future, or
the foreclosing of that possibility’ (Larkin, 2013: 333; Sneath et al., 2009). In terms of
methods, such meanings can be read from oﬃcial texts as well as from the everyday
sayings and doings of technocrats and practitioners who build, work at and use
infrastructure.
The second process refers to mobilizing the agency of technology and infrastructure.
Literature on political topography treats things in space as representative of claims to
authority – whether by the state or other actors. This is limited as infrastructure also does
something. It makes up space, opening up possibilities while making other courses of action
less likely. As MacKenzie (2006: 12) has shown, models and technical devices do not simply
describe and help operate the economy – transport through ports in our case –, they are
‘engine[s]’: an ‘active force transforming its environment, not a camera passively recording it’.
They draw actors into speciﬁc ways of understanding the world and acting in it (Easterling,
2014). Benchmarkings and rankings are one such technology that draws sites closer, or apart,
in ways that do not correspond to their physical proximity. They are a device to make distant
concerns felt in Tanzania, and in Dar for that matter, by placing the port of Dar in a virtual
comparative relation with other sites elsewhere (Larner and Le Heron, 2002; Prince, 2016).
According to Barry, technologies of compatibility and harmonization form a space of their
own – made up of common measurements, integrated systems of production and common
regulatory and quality standards (Barry, 2006: 240) – that remains invisible through a
topographical lens. The idea of ‘technological zones’ he advances is thus helpful to grasp
the broader political geography of ports.
Similar to imaginaries, technical devices shed light on the relations mobilized around
infrastructure hubs that construct inclusion and exclusion in speciﬁc ways. Both
transform experiences of proximity and distance, of accelerated speed but also of new
forms of exclusion. They embody politics by making issues visible, creating necessities and
ascribing authority in new ways. Such processes do not imply that powerful machines
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operate for the market and against the state. Rather, as Louise Amoore (2013) has argued in
the context of the ‘War on Terror’, computational models and other technology often
coproduce and authorize sovereign acts with and for states.
To summarize this section, a topological stance on socio-spatial relations is crucial for
understanding the political geographies of infrastructure hubs. But to embrace the idea that
our world is made up of relations and hence more ﬂuid and open to constant change than
traditionally assumed does not imply to ‘replace topography [. . .] with a topological theory
of space, place and politics as encounter, performed and ﬂuid’ (Jones, 2009: 492). As argued
above, ﬂows and bounded space are both historically speciﬁc products of relations. They co-
evolve. Ports are an excellent illustration of how ﬂows and movement remain constrained by
historically inherited spatial ﬁxes and new territorializing strategies, which at the same time
provide the conditions that enable them. Political spatialities are ‘stories so far’, yet there are
strategies of ﬁxing space or making things move, and their products, that can be traced
however unstable and open to change these might be. To do so, a ‘topolographical’
methodology that draws from the rich tradition of political topography and political
topology, is best attuned to capture changing political spatialities of infrastructure hubs.
The port of Dar es Salaam will serve to explore the political geography of a maritime
infrastructure hub based on the above.
The re-emergence of infrastructure investment in Africa
and the port of Dar es Salaam
African infrastructure, and ports in particular, are back on the international agenda,5 as
forcefully as in the high times of modernization theory in the 1950s and 60s. Over the past 30
years, the scale and integration of the shipping and logistics industry have increased
substantially, with economic ﬁnancialization and deregulation further easing transoceanic
trade and transforming ports, and containers spearheading a revolution in transport
(Levinson, 2006). In addition, a new international agenda around infrastructure is built
on the vision that more physical infrastructure spurs economic growth, by integrating the
continent both internally as well as into the global economy (Caldero´n, 2009). The 24th
summit of the African Union discussed infrastructure as one of three major themes,
underscoring the extent to which this vision has been embraced by African governments
(AU, African Union, 2015). In Tanzania, several port projects are under way. One is the
refurbishment of the port of Dar es Salaam, jointly funded by the World Bank, the UK
Department for International Development (DFID) and TradeMark East Africa (USD 565-
596 million – sources diﬀer as to the exact ﬁgure).6
The port of Dar es Salaam is one of the largest ports in sub-Saharan Africa. Both the
German and the British favoured Dar es Salaam, which soon outpaced what had hitherto
been the main port, Bagamoyo.7 Thereafter, under British rule, cargo handling swelled from
1938 to 1956 (Hance and Van Dongen, 1958), while after independence in 1961 cargo
throughput increased fourfold in the decade ending in 1975 (Hoyle, 1978). The decades of
structural adjustment and economic recovery brought a period of uncertainty for the port, as
well as tighter competition from neighbouring seaports. The latter is stressed in the more
recent, dominant narrative about Dar es Salaam port. This account portrays the port in
relentless competition with Mombasa for the status of main gateway to East Africa (Wood,
2004). The portrait is misleading, however, as even though Dar es Salaam continues to
handle approximately 90% of Tanzania’s international trade, only 30% of it corresponds
with trans-shipment cargo to and from Zambia, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), Burundi and Rwanda (AfDB, African Development Bank, 2010). In addition, this
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dominant narrative underlines congestion. To do so, it draws heavily on oft-quoted oﬃcial
ﬁgures showing that throughput has recently increased by 10% annually, and that
containerized imports and total throughput have equally skyrocketed, exceeding the
estimated capacity of the port to handle Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) by 30%
(Shkaratan, 2012; TPA, 2014; World Bank, 2013, 2014).
The cardinal nature of the port of Dar es Salaam as logistical hub of the city itself, of
Tanzania and of the broader region makes it a crucial site through which to observe new
political geographies as they emerge around such infrastructure hubs.
Multiple claims to authority in an expanding archipelago of territories
Until the early 2000s, Dar port was run by the Tanzanian Port Authority (TPA). Under state
ownership and management, the port physical layout had changed very little,
despite recurrent donor-funded investments from the late 1950s to the early 1990s. With
only minor alterations, in the 2000s port boundaries still remained circumscribed to the
location designated by German colonial administrators in the Kurasini Ward, to the
south of the Central Business District. While the port did not undergo any major
regeneration, that was not the case for the city of Dar es Salaam. Its unplanned
geographical expansion – today stretching over 1800 square kilometres – gradually
encircled the port with residential, commercial and, to a lesser extent, industrial areas.
From the late 1990s onwards, however, the port of Dar es Salaam became a shorthand, in
the words of policymakers and donors, for bottlenecks and congestion. According to
experts’ reports and the media, the port had turned into a vast ‘storage area’; this internal
congestion engulfed nearby roads, rendering them massive bottlenecks that asphyxiated
cargo ﬂows. It was in 2006 that the government conceived the ﬁrst expansion of the port:
an expansion of the Oil Jetty over Kurasini that involved the resettlement of 36,000 residents
(Ndezi, 2009). More recently, the port encroached into the urban fabric and metamorphosed
internally, with parts of it handed over to private management. Congestion coupled with the
ideal of the ‘port-as-gateway’ (see more detailed discussion below) instigated port
territorialities to mutate along two lines throughout the 2000s. Firstly, the port logistical
area expanded over nearby quarters through a patchwork of Inland Container Depots
(ICDs). Secondly, the privatization of parts of the port transformed its layout and re-
articulated authority over circulation.
First, TPA adopted the idea of ICDs from more industrialized port cities in order to
expand storage capacity and ease clearance procedures. The creation of ICDs added to an
array of ever-increasing port-related logistical satellites that came to colonize spaces beyond
the port gates. Firstly, across the port road, existing container warehouses were expanded
and new ones inaugurated; secondly, towards the southeast, oil storage facilities swelled;
thirdly, about a dozen ICDs gradually opened. Thereby, ICDs came into existence in the
latter half of the 2000s, premised upon the rationale of alleviating storage constraints within
the port by transferring a proportion of the incoming containers and vehicles to mostly
privately managed facilities until clearance. Still, revenue authorities perform in situ
clearance procedures; and routine or impromptu veriﬁcations of quality, and weights and
measures, amongst others, are carried out here by other governmental agencies. Progressive
drops in dwell time animated the government to gradually license more ICDs to private
logistical operators, up to the present stock of about a dozen such depots. Scattered over a
radius of twelve kilometres, ICDs established themselves principally along the road to the
airport and Ubungo, while some preferred the vicinities of Dar’s main Export Processing
Zone. In so doing, ICDs outlined an ‘archipelago’ of commercially run, state-supervised
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logistical facilities. This archipelago not only redeﬁned the boundaries of the port, but also
rearticulated its economic and political geography by means of renewed relations premised
upon proximity to the port – metric and social in terms of relations with port authorities. On
the latter, in the eyes of some consignees, ICDs brought about collusive business relations
between private owners and top oﬃcials in TPA, who secured protection and more activity
to certain ICDs.8
In addition, the expansion of ICDs and other satellite activities re-invoked a territorial
exercise of authority in its most classical and indeed repressive sense. Territoriality is a modern
political technology that comes with the sovereign exercise of force (Sack, 1986) in order to
police access to the port or port-related facilities. When the expansion of port-related activities
encroached upon areas in the vicinities of the port, several communities were displaced from
their neighbourhoods. When in 2009 the government launched an expansion of the Kurasini
Oil Jetty, for example, it led to the resettlement of more than 36,000 people from the Kurasini
ward (Ndezi, 2009). Crucially, territory as a technology of exerting political authority is not
necessarily restricted to state authority. In the case of the ICDs, the splitting of handling and
storage operations between state and commercial operators mutated the exercise of
territoriality from a state-centred to an enmeshed public–private arrangement in which
public authority became re-envisioned as operating through commercial tools and expertise.9
Secondly, in the early 2000s cargo and container operations were split into two terminals,
and the container terminal was handed over to a private operator, Tanzania International
Container Terminal Services Ltd (TICTS). TICTS is a joint venture between world-leading
port operator Hutchison Port Holdings of Hong Kong and a Tanzanian business group.
Hence, TICTS started to handle exclusively the containerized cargo mooring in berths 8 to
11, as well as utilizing the largest section of the container yard for temporary storage. This
change expressed a shift not only in who wields authority, but also in what authority is
ascribed to. Privatization was anticipated to increase the eﬃciency of the port and transform
it into a more proﬁtability venture.
It could be argued that, with the new public–private arrangement, the TPA saw its role
diminish as the operation of the container terminal was outsourced. In contrast to fully
privatized models, however, the Tanzania Port Authority retained the operation of the
remaining berths and, in accordance with its handling of bulk cargo, most sheds and
warehouses providing storage capacity for non-containerized cargo remained under their
administration. Furthermore, Tanzania adopted a ‘landlord’ port model so that state
agencies retained a wealth of regulatory capacities within the port premises across both
terminals. The Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) retained its core jurisdiction over
taxation of trade activities. In particular, it remains the sole agency allowed to authorize
the displacement of containers, or bulk cargo, inside and/or outside the port. Other state
agencies perform a variety of controls that may also alter traﬃc ﬂows. A diminishment of
state power is thus not the outcome of these transformations, as some critics of privatization
might have it. Rather, ideas and practices of how the port should be run changed and
became rearticulated in transnational ‘modes of government’ through devolution of
practices to companies, individuals and other intermediaries (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002:
989–990; also Ong, 2006). On the one hand, it is ‘the state’ itself that is made through such
transnational practices, and indeed domestic elites use them to (re)produce the state in new
ways (Ong, 2006, also Mitchell, 2002). On the other, ‘transnational apparatuses of
governmentality [. . .] overlay[. . .] and coexist[. . .] with older, nation-state based modes of
governance’ (Mitchell, 2002: 994).
Through the lens of political topography, another transformation of authority comes to
light – the evolving transnational relations of public agents. Thus, for instance, the
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establishment of the Fair Competition Commission (FCC) installed a new mediator between
multinational corporations and the port authorities. Attempts on the part of the FCC to
enforce anti-counterfeit regulations anchored locally the eﬀorts of multinationals such as
Samsung, Phillips and Unilever to protect their high value trade across transnational routes
and market places. While therefore, engineers and representatives from these multinational
companies need only descend upon Tanzania once every three months, through the FCC’s
mediation they oversee their interests in the Tanzanian market from a distance. As Sidaway
(2007) supposed, transport hubs such as ports can indeed ‘be read as spaces of sovereign
graduation’.
This is further supported by the continued relationship of port-related authorities with the
European Commission, the World Bank and DFID. In particular, the World Bank and
DFID – through the multi-donor funded TradeMark East Africa – footed the USD 565
million bill for the refurbishment of Dar port and its vicinities. The project, launched in
2015, aims to reduce ship turnaround and container dwell time to increase throughput
(World Bank, 2014). In addition to material resource, international donors provide the
intellectual justiﬁcation for such agenda, in accordance with the ‘Big Results Now’
narrative. This initiative was inspired by the ‘Malaysian Development Model’ and has
been implemented since 2013 to deliver quantiﬁable policy outcomes in six priority areas.
Predicated upon the trinity of trade, investment and poverty reduction, this ‘theory of
change’ anticipates increased physical access to markets, an enhanced trade environment
and improved business competitiveness.10 The external actors’ ideological proximity ﬁnds a
parallel in the physical closeness of their oﬃces situated in the business district of Dar.
The above topographical analysis of the changing political geographies of Dar port
focused on the physical outlet of the port as well as the way in which relations of political
authority are re-articulated, and exerted diﬀerently by various actors. A new archipelago of
territorialities has taken shape where previously the port existed alone, and is managed by a
heterogeneous set of actors with distinct, graduated (Ong, 2006) claims to authority over
particular issue areas and spaces. The Dar hub for maritime transport extended ever further
into the urban fabric, thereby dislodging people to make space for further throughput of
goods. Inspired by global logistical discourses and technologies, authorities framed such an
endeavour under a nascent topological imagination of the port as globally connected,
‘seamless’ space. The changes in the port’s surface space and political topography,
therefore, need to be understood in this context: the shift from ‘port-as-checkpoint’ to
‘port-as-gateway’. Some of the most powerful transformations of political geography are
not traceable through a focus on changes in Eucledian space or claims to formal authority
over it as drawn from the literature on political topography.
Gateway imaginaries, technological zones and modernity
‘from scratch’
In recasting the port of Dar es Salaam from port-as-checkpoint to gateway, port
stakeholders enact visions of circulation and ﬂow, and (re)produce zones, which
together perform seamless space. Power topologies aﬀord the substrates that coproduce
and legitimize transformations of port geographies. This will be illustrated in the three
following subsections. The ﬁrst revolves around ‘gateways’ and ‘seamless space’ as
discursive tropes, and benchmarking as technology that situates the port against a
network of regional port facilities. The second shows how standards and technical devices
further bridge historical diﬀerence in order to render Dar port a smooth part of a
transcontinental technological zone. The third part demonstrates how the gateway ideal in
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Tanzania comes wrapped in new notions of modernity that weave imagery of a Dubai-style
exuberant development into the standardized eﬃciency of global capitalism pitching reform
of the old Dar port against a project of building a new port altogether.
In tagging the three processes as topological, we do not wish to downplay their close
entanglement with the described topographical ideas and practices. The very argument is
that metric relations of power, proximity and distance co-evolve with non-Eucledian
relations, and that methodologically drawing from political topography and topology is
most fruitful to understand the multiple and changing spatialities of the port of Dar es
Salaam.
From port-as-checkpoint to ‘gateway’ and ‘seam-space’
The idea of ports as gateways establishes the port as a ‘somewhere’ that is not about
boundaries but movement and connections: a paramount link in a chain binding sea and
land, facilitating the ﬂow of goods through transport corridors. Yet at the same time, ports
are critical nodes of infrastructure that, as much as they enable connectivity, also allow
multiple actors to control these global connections with a territorial logic. This double
function is expressed in a project based on what Marres (2012) refers to as topological
imaginaries: to transform the port of Dar from an enclave to a ‘gateway’ (TPA, 2016a;
World Bank, 2014).
In the early 2000s, ﬁgures for dwell time in the port of Dar es Salaam steadily increased
due to the concern of port authorities with pilferage and corruption, which led, in turn, to
focus on clearing procedures.11 Rising warehousing costs and a leisurely grace period – 14
days for domestic cargo – had turned the port of Dar into a huge storing area, thus defeating
the purpose of a transit facility. Yet such insistence also permeated that port authorities saw
the port as a checkpoint rather than one link along a chain of logistical infrastructure. Every
link in the chain – the road linking the port to the ICDs, transhipment facilities,
weighbridges, and checkpoints – thus constituted a bottleneck, potential or actualized; or,
in the grammar of port stakeholders, a source of ‘congestion’ or a ‘thin pipe.’12
Yet ideas about the port changed over time. References began to appear in policy
documents culminating in the 2016 port handbook, which included: ‘new gateways to the
hinterland’; or as ‘the Indian Ocean terminus of a complex logistics network stretching
across much of Central Africa’ (TPA, 2016b: 3, 9). Reference to other ports such as
Mombasa became crucial in this process. Senior ministerial oﬃcers, authorities sitting in
the port and donors increasingly pitted the underperformance of Dar es Salaam against that
of Mombasa, and vice versa, as a means to legitimize additional spatial interventions.
These observations reﬂect a second facet of the transition from port-as-checkpoint to
gateway wedded to region building: imaginaries of regional closeness and benchmarking
drew Dar’s neighbours closer. Such ‘presencing’ (Prince, 2016) supported reforms towards
further integration. In its most physical manifestation, this transition envisaged reinforcing
two trade arteries: the Central Corridor (from Dar es Salaam to Rwanda, Burundi and the
DRC), as well as the Southern Corridor (Dar es Salaam to Zambia). In a less physical sense,
such reinforcement aimed to reduce the time it takes a container to reach Rwanda, Burundi,
the DRC, Zambia and Malawi from Dar es Salaam. Symbolically, this project compounded
the heightening in visibility of the geographical chain binding the port with ﬁnal
destinations.
In Dar, such heightening and presencing occurs by means of an array of initiatives. First,
the documents produced by port authorities and donors reproduce ad nauseam selectively
picked indicators of port performance, notably dwell time and the average time or cost
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required to transport a container from the port to Rwanda, and compare them with the same
metrics for Mombasa. Port authorities, clearing agents and transporters indeed speak of
distances to Rwanda in days, not in kilometres, exemplifying how they quantify seamlessness
in dwell time.13 Also, international actors such as Trademark East Africa and the Central
Corridor Transport Observatory enact benchmarking exercises to assess the eﬃciency of the
port – benchmarks that render the port of Dar es Salaam comparable (TMEA, TradeMark
East Africa and CCTTFA, Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Authority,
2014). Benchmarking exercises, as those undertaken in the reports of the World Bank,
TradeMark East Africa, and the CCTTFA, are crucial to rendering logistical
infrastructures comparable and, thus, suitable for common regulatory standards (Barry,
2006), as will be detailed in the next section. Second, in their discourses port stakeholders
invariably deprecate the roadblocks, weighbridges and other facilities along the way to other
east African destinations. In their views, each roadblock removed equates a victory against
the plague of congestion.
What is invoked, therefore, is the port as part of a seamless space. The gateway metaphor
speaks of seamless ﬂows through the port and related corridors, with such seamlessness
measured in dwell time metrics. In that sense, ‘drawing closer’ does not topographically
shrink distances measured in kilometres, but instead topologically compresses space.
However, as noted by Marres (2012), topological visions might bring about such eﬀects in
the ﬁrst place.
Technological zones and the power of technical devices
A second element of the political topology of ports is the laws of logistics. Related
technologies have come to govern many of the ﬂows moved by ship (Cowen, 2014), and
subsequently through Dar port. Dar, as imagined by port authorities and donors alike,
resembles other major ports worldwide, whereby ensuring that traﬃc functions
‘seamlessly’ comes with new information systems to shorten waiting times and to ‘secure’
traﬃc in speciﬁc ways.
In particular, a new e-customs technology was introduced at Dar port. The Tanzanian
Revenue Authority launched the Tanzania Customs Integrated System (TANCIS) in 2014,
‘built on hi-tech principles with a view to increasing eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, transparency, and
reliability in the Customs administration’.14 TANCIS follows similar systems introduced in
Hong Kong (1986), Singapore (1989–1991), Malaysia (1996–2004), Ghana (2001) and Nigeria
(2009). Kenya also joined in 2015. Crucially, TANCIS has since substituted physical
encounters between tax oﬃcials and clearing agents in favour of electronic procedures to
handle Pre-Arrival Declarations. The new technical device powerfully transformed who
controls, or may interfere for that matter, with ﬂows of cargo, further integrating Dar port
into a ‘global’ gateway infrastructure. The new technology also made it possible to dispense of
cashmen and messengers who previously roamed around the city and port. However, it did not
fully supplant previous practice, with some handling still carried out on paper. This facilitated
tax agents to switch from virtual to physical environment at their convenience and thus retain
a more autonomous margin for manoeuvre in governing port activities.15 This technological
zone is thus characterized by substantial frictions. Nevertheless, it is a bounded space governed
and deﬁned by technical standards and harmonized technology, not physical boundaries
(Barry, 2006). Indeed, globalized production, supply chains and logistics systems generate
transformations of the conception of border.
However, while ‘seam space’ is (re)produced by international standards and technology,
which include electronic biometric technologies (Cowen, 2010: 606) and e-customs systems,
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technologies are also important in producing territoriality as still importantmode of governing
global ﬂows (Opitz and Tellmann, 2012). The port authority of Dar es Salaam, with the
assistance of the World Bank, installed 465 closed-circuit television sets, and purchased
patrol boats and vehicles. It commissioned an Integrated Security System in 2015,
introducing electronic security cards for secure access to facilities, and endorsed the use of
scanners at the entrance gates (TPA, 2016b). Displayed on security signs at each gate is that
‘[t]he port is ISPS Code compliant’, ISPS referring to the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code, which applies to 20,000 ports worldwide.16 Annual inspections by external
auditors ensure compliance. In reality, there are of course persistent holes in the security
arrangements. When it comes to oﬃcers policing port gates, and as explained by the Acting
Port Manager: ‘the decision that who should be allowed, who should not be allowed depends
on the person there. He’s the ﬁnal decider [. . .] so [. . .] it’s not a control per se, because it
depends on how do you persuade him.’17 Nevertheless, the project to bring the port ‘up to
international standards’ is a powerful trope that shapes the port’s political geography.
What TANCIS and international security standards reveal, therefore, is not so much the
resilience of shady settlements, but rather the association of the port, and of port authorities,
with a conundrum of technologies, software and equipment that make up a transboundary
technological zone. Within it, it becomes possible to connect to, but also to assess and
contrast Dar with other ports worldwide. Far from being merely a-political technical
devices, the notion of the technological zone captures more invisible connections and
enclosures that channel ﬂows through Dar and the broader east African region.
Topologies of anticipation and modernity ‘from scratch’: Bringing Dubai to Bagamoyo
A ﬁnal, striking feature of Dar port topology is that debates around Tanzanian ports
reinvigorate imaginaries of modernity that are as prevalent as in the 1960s. Consequently,
discourses broadcast by port authorities and donors about the port frequently pit notions of
old, congested or unﬁt structures against the anticipated possibilities of new facilities to be
built from scratch. This is visible in representations of port terminals as old and backwards
versus new, but more crucially in the debate over increasing eﬃciency of Dar port versus
constructing a new mega-port at Bagamoyo.
Especially the latter illustrates how infrastructure comes to represent ‘the possibility of
being modern, of having a future, or the foreclosing of that possibility’ (Larkin, 2013: 333).
The mega-port project was presented by the Kikwete government as making the Tanzanian
state a ‘gateway’ to modernity. The modernity envisioned here no longer follows Western
models though but the archetype of new special zones of development, Dubai (see also
Sidaway, 2007). The Bagamoyo port project was originally conceived of as relatively
small two-berth, USD 225 million port in the mid-2000s. By 2009, however, it had
expanded into a USD 680 million facility (TPA, 2009) and by 2013 a USD 10 billion
brand new port, funded by China and Oman, with a capacity to handle 20 million TEUs
– about thirty times the 2014 throughput of Dar es Salaam (TPA, 2015). The announcement
in 2013 served to escalate further the ‘space race’ with the Kenyan government, which by
then had stated its intention to build a USD 13 billion mega-port in Lamu. President
Kikwete ventured to lay the foundation stone of the Bagamoyo port during the electoral
campaign of 2015; his successor Magufuli shelved the project three months later but only
postponed the start of construction to 2017.
The project of modernity represented by Bagamoyo, albeit contested by a fraction of the
political elites, operates by means of a twofold movement.19 On the one hand, its promoters
tarnish the existing port of Dar, and deprecate it as old and un-modern, treating in interviews
Ho¨nke and Cuesta-Fernandez 13
old infrastructures, personnel and practices as superﬂuous, even troublesome clutter that
cannot be modernized. This provides the foundation for the second movement: presenting
the inescapable need for a new port to be built from scratch. Thus, in the interim between
2013 and 2015, public authorities had enthusiastically embraced the prospect of the new port
in an undeveloped location as the durable solution to the problems of space within the port and
of congestion around it. Interestingly for the analysis in hand, imaginaries of modernity
recurrently surfaced in the controversies about the Bagamoyo project.19 Powerful narratives
of hope permeated port reforms, suggesting that notions of ‘unreconstructed modernism’
(Abbink, 2012) still instigate and legitimate large-scale infrastructure projects.
Apart fromtheWorldBanknarrative of theport as gateway to economic growth, thesehopes
are centred around distinct ‘economies of anticipation’ (Cross, 2015) attached to a ‘Dubai
model’. The Tanzanian president stated in 2014: ‘If we invest in logistic centres, improve on
infrastructure and create a facilitative environment, we can easily turn Dar es Salaam into
another Dubai of its kind’.20 This idea was then adhered to the new Bagamoyo mega-project.
The content of thisDubaimodel remained rather vague, but includedwhatChorin (2010) refers
to as the standard use of the term: to emulate Dubai’s exceptional development including its
logistics facilities (despite Dubai’s unique circumstances). Cowen’s (2014) work on the Dubai
Logistics City indeed strongly resonates with the narratives underpinning the Bagamoyo
scheme: the seamlessness that the Dubai Logistics City so aptly underpins the Bagamoyo
project as the enactment of a new, exceptional zone of development in the vicinity of Dar es
Salaam. So far, only feasibility studies and initial constructionwork have been undertaken, and
people have been resettled from theMbegani area.21While diﬃcult to emulate and still with an
uncertain future, as powerful vision, Dubai has been folded into Tanzanian debates over
maritime transport and urban development.
Conclusion
This article looked at Dar es Salam port (and its unbuilt competitor Bagamoyo to some
extent) as a window onto new political geographies of large-scale economic
infrastructures. It argued for drawing on political topography and topology for a
topolographical methodology in order to capture processes of making ﬂow, and ﬁxing,
which together make up contemporary political geographies of infrastructure hubs.
Instead of treating them as irreconcilable ontological traditions, we argued for
complimentary synthesis to adequately understand ﬂows as imbued with claims to
power and authority, and ﬂuid potential for change as embedded in moorings on
which ﬂows very much rely. While infrastructures of logistics encapsulate ideas of
mobility, their geography crucially includes topological and topographical technologies
of security, exclusion and exploitation.
In this regard, we argued that political topography draws attention to where the port is
and who is aﬀorded authority over its surface space, but that there is more to the respacing
of political geographies than this captures. Drawing on the literature on political topology,
other dimensions matter, such as the projection of power across distance, and the drawing
close of distant others independent from formal authority and physical presence. Two key
devices do this work: imaginaries associated with infrastructure, and technical devices. Both
are actively involved in the politics of infrastructure, opening up possibilities while making
other courses of action less likely. Building on this combined heuristic, we have shown how
Dar port evolved into an archipelago of territorialities that transcends well beyond its
traditional boundaries; and that relations that reproduce territorial authority mutated
over time and became dispersed and graduated between various state agents and petty
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bureaucrats, international organizations and logistics, shipping and other multinational
companies. As such, authority has become dispersed and exercised via intermediaries,
most importantly commercial operators.
However, thinking through political topology revealed important dimensions of a
reconﬁguration of political geographies traditional political topography fails to capture.
First, a project of topological compression shaped the very political topography of
Dar port. Imageries of the port moved from port-as-checkpoint to ‘gateway’. Together
with rankings that benchmarked Dar against other ports, these drew distant places closer
to Dar and made the concerns of distant others felt more keenly in the port and shaped
port reforms. In addition, technical devices were crucial in constituting the port as part
of technological zones in which the exercise of power is diﬀuse and hides itself as it
works via seemingly a-political standards and technology. Finally, the controversy over
the refurbishment of Dar port versus building a new mega-port at Bagamoyo illustrated
how large-scale economic infrastructure cannot be understood without due consideration
of new topologies of anticipation of modernity. Hugely understudied, in Dar these do not
revolve around a Western model but fold a Dubai City inspired aspiration to
development into the politics of infrastructure. The idea of a ‘Dubai model’ here was
mobilized for plans to build ‘modernity from scratch’ where once the old slave port of
Bagamoyo was.
Large-scale economic infrastructures are indeed crucial entry points for making the
workings of global politics more visible, and for capturing future spatialities of zones and
(channelled) ﬂows. The topolographical methodology suggested here addresses precisely the
intersection of the production of territories and ﬂows, and the power topographies and
topologies making these possible. Much work lies ahead to understand the contentious re-
spacing of political geographies around large-scale economic infrastructures. This article has
hopefully contributed a useful approach to this endeavor.
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Notes
1. See the Big Results Now website: www.pmoralg.go.tz/quick-menu/brn/ (accessed 30 March 2016).
2. Complementing the broader vision of an East and Central African Corridor Project by the
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa. See The World Bank (n.d.) Dar es Salaam Maritime
Gateway Project. Available at: www.worldbank.org/projects/P150496?lang¼en (accessed 26
May 2016); The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (n.d.) Eastern and Central Transport
Corridor. Available at: www.icafrica.org/en/topics-programmes/eastern-and-central-transport-
corridors/ (accessed 26 May 2016).
3. For a critique of this tendency to dichotomy, see Martin and Secor (2014).
4. It has recently been suggested to understand topography as a particular dimension of topology:
that of Euclidean geometry (Martin and Secor, 2014) and the ‘‘numbers, distribution, movements,
and connections across [such] Euclidean surface space’’ (McFarlane, 2016: 632).
5. See for example the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, www.icafrica.org/en/. Also Ford (2006).
6. The World Bank (2014) Tanzania today signed a memorandum of understanding with a coalition
of development partners to develop Dar es Salaam port. Available at: www.worldbank.org/en/
news/press-release/2014/09/12/memorandum-of-understanding-coalition-of-development-
partners-dar-es-salaam-port (accessed 27 May 2016).
7. For the politics around shifting the main colonial port away from Bagamoyo to Dar, see Fabian
(2007).
8. Anonymous Consignee (2016). Interview 28 April, Dar es Salaam.
9. This shift has not been without frictions and contestation. People refused to resettle, and within the
port archipelago, petty sovereigns – state and non-state, and from various agencies – struggle over
power and authority. It will require another article to expand on these processes.
10. According to TradeMark East Africa’s website: www.trademarkea.com (accessed 27 May 2016).
11. Mwanyange J (2008) TRA cracks down on fake import papers. The East African, 23 June, 2008.
Available at: www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/440644/-/s3sb5vz/-/index.html (accessed 27
May 2016).
12. Anonymous Logistical Operator (2015). Interview 27 April.
13. Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Authority (n.d.). Inland Container Deports.
Available at: http://centralcorridor-ttfa.org/infrastructure/inland-container-deports/ (accessed 26
May 2016).
14. Tanzania Revenue Authority (n.d.). What is TANCIS? Available at: www.tra.go.tz/index.php/
faqs/405-what-is-tancis (accessed 26 May 2016).
15. Anonymous Freight Forwarder (2015) Interview 14 April, Dar es Salaam; also Masasi J (2015)
Interview 27 April, Dar es Salaam.
16. International Maritime Organization (n.d.). Solas XI-2 and the ISPS Code. Available at: www.
imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%
20Code.aspx (accessed 27 May 2016).
17. Mhanga H (2015). Interview 28 April, Dar es Salaam.
18. We do not deny that such infrastructural projects are also about gaining access to government
contracts and rewarding patron–client networks. This was evident, for example, in the sacking of
the TPA’s top management and the disbanding of its board by President Magufuli in December
2015 on corruption charges. It is rather that clientelist patterns of resource distribution cannot tell
the whole story.
19. ‘From scratch’ would of course only be partly true as Bagamoyo district hosts one of the oldest
ports on the east African coast – see Fabian (2007).
16 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 0(0)
20. Blair E and Ng’wanakilala F (2014) Tanzania president maps out plan for transport hub. Reuters,
11 April, 2014. Available at: www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/us-africa-summit-tanzania-
transportation-idUSBREA3A1JN20140411 (accessed 27 May 2016).
21. Exact figures are difficult to ascertain. Tanzanian newspapers cite a figure of 2183 residents
resettled AND compensated to date – see Mirondo R (2016) Fate of Bagamoyo port clarified.
The Citizen, 9 January, 2016. Available at: www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Fate-of-Bagamoyo-Port-
clarified/-/1840340/3026666/-/11ug0kd/-/index.html (accessed 27 May 2016).
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